Interpersonal relations are shaped by the judgements associated with the social categories that individuals perceive in their social contacts. I develop a model of how those judgments form based on a theory of symbolic values. The model depicts the interaction between two values, one associated with an inherited ethnic trait ("nationality") and one with an endogenous achievement trait ("income"). Individuals who are less likely to achieve are predicted to invest more value on nationalism and to have hostile relations with immigrants. Multiple equilibria are possible and better schooling may eliminate equilibria with xenophobia. Econometric findings from three large surveys corroborate the predictions derived from the theoretical model. 
Introduction
Interpersonal relations have an idiosyncratic and a common component. On the one hand, any interpersonal relation is the product of a unique history of interactions between concrete human beings and of their memories of that history. On the other hand, interpersonal relations unfold in a socially constructed mental frame: individuals encounter each other as carriers of traits whose saliency and meaning are to a large extent socially determined. People …rst meet as men and women, white and black, subordinate and boss, and only after -if their communication deepens -as individualized persons. First encounters 1 are governed by the expectations and judgements associated with the social categories -like gender, race, and occupation -that individuals perceive in their social contacts.
Those judgements heavily a¤ect the utility derived from interpersonal relations. They may determine whether a …rst encounter begins with a smile or with raised eyebrows, with deference or disdain, with a handshake or an erected …nger. And the quality of a …rst encounter may determine whether the relation continues and on which track. Since social judgments carry such heavy consequences, people's search for personal contacts as well as their e¤orts to avoid them, along with the resulting network of relations, depend on the prevailing stereotypes associated with social categories.
What drives people's evaluation of social categories? The formation of values and attitudes is the object of longstanding lines of research in sociology, psychology, anthropology and even biology. Economic analysis based on the traditional rational-choice paradigm can contribute novel insights into those issues and thereby enrich our understanding of economic phenomena like the accumulation of human capital, the persistence of inequality, and long-run growth. To substantiate that claim, I will …rst sketch the main ideas of a theory of symbolic values that was proposed by Jeanne (2009a, 2009b) .
That theory o¤ers an economic perspective on value formation and can be utilized to study the social determination of interpersonal relations. Based on it, I will then develop a model of the relations between two di¤erent ethnic groups in a country: natives and immigrants. That model o¤ers an explanation for the existence of xenophobia and for its interplay with the ability to invest in human capital. Finally, the model's predictions will be confronted with empirical evidence obtained from three large representative surveys.
Some personal characteristics, like nationality and professional activity, seem to be invested with symbolic values by human beings. These values determine the esteem that individuals receive from other people as well as their self-esteem. Those values are symbolic in the sense that they are immaterial: they a¤ect the well-being of individuals -so they are values -but without a¤ecting their consumption of material goods -so they are symbolic.
A system of symbolic values is a set of judgments about salient characteristics. The theory of symbolic values aims at explaining the variation of those judgments across social groups and single individuals. For instance, individuals in a given country may attach a very di¤erent value to descending from an aristocratic family or to being divorced. They may attach a di¤erent value to tax evasion: an individual may view it as immoral, another one may view it as just clever. Endorsed symbolic values determine how one feels when having those salient characteristics and how one behaves towards those who have those characteristics.
The theory of symbolic values is based on four main assumptions:
1) Evaluative attitude. Individuals pass judgments of approval, admiration, etc., and their opposite upon certain traits, acts, and outcomes.
Those judgements are determined by an individual's value system, which is a way to allocate value to bundles of judgeable characteristics. Formally, the value system of an individual is a function that maps an exogenous set of judgeable types onto the real line.
2) Social approbativeness. Individuals desire a good opinion of oneself on the part of other people.
The relevant human environment for approbativeness may be an individual's family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, or society at large. The desired ways of thinking may be in a scale that distinguishes contempt, indi¤erence, interest, approval, praise, admiration, and veneration.
3) Self-approbativeness. Individuals have a desire for self-esteem. This desire for a pleasing idea of oneself presupposes self-consciousness. Humans are both actors and spectators of what they do. Since they are evaluative beings, they also judge themselves. 4) Consistency. The standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual applies to himself are the same as those which he applies to other people.
This postulate corresponds to the rule of judging yourself as you would judge of others. While psychologists have identi…ed ways of self-deception, in the main individuals are subject to the control by the logic of consistency. It is di¢ cult to systematically approve 2 in oneself acts which one condemns in others, and when one does so, his fellows are quick to point out the inconsistency.
Value systems arise within various socialization structures. Symbolic values are transmitted in a cultural process by agencies of socialization like the family, the peers, and the media. Parents are a main agency of socialization and the theory of symbolic values has been utilized to study how altruistic parents socialize their children in various contexts. The study of purposive socialization in economic models has been pioneered by Verdier (1998, 2000) . In their models, vertical socialization, along with random imitation, determines the long-term distribution of cultural traits in the population. The theory of symbolic values mainly di¤ers from Bisin and Verdier's one in two respects. First, Bisin and Verdier assume that parents want their children to have the same cultural trait as themselves. They motivate this assumption by the possibility of "imperfect empathy"
on the side of parents. This means that parents evaluate their children's actions using their (the parents') preferences. In the theory of symbolic values, parents choose the value system of their children so as to maximize the child's utility. 2 Second, the objects that are transmitted from parents to children are modeled in di¤erent ways. Whereas in Bisin and Verdier's theory parents transmit a preference trait, in ours they transmit a value system. The essential property of a value system is that, taking it in conjunction with an individual's attributes, it determines the esteem enjoyed by the individual. In the theory of symbolic values, individuals have preferences over esteem and the usual list of consumption goods. The advantage of modeling socialization to a value system rather than to a preference trait is that one keeps preferences …xed, so that normative analysis based on the Pareto criterion is possible. A cost of this modeling approach is that one has to add esteem to the standard arguments of the utility function. This is also true of Bisin and Verdier's theory, which introduces the o¤spring's preference parameter in the parent's utility function.
A model of immigrants-natives relations
I will now apply the theory of symbolic values to study the interpersonal relations between immigrants and natives. 3 Beliefs in the superiority of one's own ethnicity may have serious implications for the relations between immigrants and natives and for a coun-2 Imperfect altruism could easily be incorporated in the theory of symbolic values. Suppose that parents also care about the esteem that they receive from their children. Since the latter depends on the value that the child attaches to the parent's traits, the parent has an incentive to bias the socialization of her child in favor of her own traits.
3 Bisin et al. (2008) and Della Giusta and Hashimzade (2009) o¤er related models of cultural assimilation of immigrants. The model in the current paper can also be interpreted as one of racial relations. try's economic performance. Immigrants constitute a sizeable share of the overall world population and often belong to the most vulnerable strata of the population. Negative stereotypes about immigrants reduce their chances in the labor market and their quality of everyday life, including life at schools and in workplaces. Natives'hostility may foster negative stereotyping by immigrants with respect to the national majority, giving rise to a mental arm race in terms of prejudices. Sometimes that race turns into episodes of violence and it often a¤ects political outcomes. 4 From an economic viewpoint, chauvinistic attitudes may be a formidable obstacle to the immigrants' integration in the domestic economy and the recognition of their talents. Natives'hostility may induce immigrants to cluster together in neighborhoods and schools, where unfavorable peer e¤ects prevent both cognitive and noncognitive abilities to develop at their potential. In this fashion, xenophobia may generate a lasting negative impact on innovation and economic growth.
In the sequel, a formal model of immigrant-natives relations is developed that allows one to dissect the role of value formation and the interplay between symbolic values and economic outcomes. Individuals have a common utility function but di¤er with respect to their nationality, ability, and family background. A fraction of the population consists of immigrants, a 4 By way of an example, in Germany right-wing extremist parties could bene…t from mounting xenophobia and anti-Semitism in some recent regional elections; as reported by Siedler (2008 Siedler ( ), between 1990 and 2005 the number of right-wing extremists in Germany more than doubled. Anti-immigrant feeling was a key factor in the electoral success of the National Front Party in the 2002 French election; as simulated by Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005) , xenophobia substantially reduced the redistributive content of the parties' electoral platforms. Historically, feelings of superiority of own nation and race seem to have been essential ingredients for the development of fascism, colonialism and imperialism. In turn, fascist leaders used their rethoric to foster racial and ethnic divisions. 5 In the Beckerian tradition, racism is an exogenous preference that implies discriminatory behavior based on race. The main insight of Becker is the role of market competition. Since racial discrimination is costly to the discriminator, free market competition drives racists out of the market. Thus, adding an evolutionary twist, thanks to markets, race-based hostility is bound to disappear. Of course, this is subject to caveats concerning the possibility of economic rents in the long run. In any case, it may take a while to arrive at the steady state and meanwhile preferences for race may persist. This raises the question of their cause. An illuminating but partial answer is provided by the approach of statistical discrimination. Groups that are readily identi…able by observers -e.g. by the color of their skin -may be known to be characterized by some average behavior. Observers use that piece of information along with other signals to forecast others' behavior. An example is when natives assign a relatively high probability to the event that an immigrant commits a crime. Hostility towards immigrants is explained as a precautionary attitude to avoid being victim of crimes. However, such attitudes often arise in absence of any compelling information about the statistical relationship between ethnicity and crime. In controlled experiments, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found no evidence of statistical discrimination and much evidence in support of mistaken ethnic stereotypes. fraction 1 consists of natives; for simplicity, all immigrants are assumed to share a common nationality. Ability is summarized by the pair ( ; ) and family background by the pair ( ; ), to be explained later. All individuals consume one homogeneous good, used as the numeraire. Each individual faces the following sequence of events: …rst, the individual exerts e¤ort in order to shape his value system; this can be interpreted as a benevolent parent socializing her child. Second, the individual, given his values, decides how much e¤ort to exert in order to achieve in economic terms. Third, Nature determines the individual achievement levels; individuals consume according to their achievements and obtain esteem and utility from interpersonal relations according to how their characteristics are valued in society.
Material Outcomes I posit that achievement is de…ned in terms of the income level obtained by the individual and consider two possible outcomes, a high income level w H and a low income level w L . Achieving is a random event which depends on an individual's ability or talent and his e¤ort, given such exogenous circumstances as the quality of schooling. Denoting by e(i) individual i's non-negative e¤ort level, the probability to succeed is given by
; where parameters are both non-negative. Parameter stands for those individual capabilities that increase achievement independently of an individual's e¤ort; measures the extent to which individual achievement is responsive to individual e¤ort.
6 E¤ort is costly, and its cost to the individual is specialized to e(i)
where ! is a preference parameter of the utility function.
Let denote the fraction of achievers. Their wage w H ( ) is assumed to satisfy w 0
. The …rst two inequalities can be seen as a reduced-form model for a labor market determination of the returns to human capital.
Value systems.
Individuals have value systems de…ned over two attributes: nationality n 2 f0; 1g and achievement a 2 f0; 1g. Let n = 1 denote domestic nationality and a = 1 denote high income. The value attached to the trait combination an by individual i is measured by a non-negative index v an (i). The collection of the four v an (i), one for each type, describes the value system of individual i; it satis…es
Value systems are determined by an exogenous factor that is common to all individuals with the same nationality (possibly the same for both nationalities) and by an endogenous 6 Both parameters may also capture the quality of the environment, e.g. the quality of schooling.
5 idiosyncratic factor. The common factor is the reference value system fb v an g for nationals and fe v an g for immigrants. The reference value system mirrors public values as put forward by collective discourse. They are the outcome of a whole history of ideas and taken as exogenously given. By way of an example, public values that stress the fundamentally equal worth of all individuals, independently of their traits, may be captured by b v an = 1=4 for all a and n. Public values that stress the superiority of own country of origin may instead give rise to b v a1 > b v a0 and e v a0 > e v a1 ; public values that stress the special worth of individual accomplishments may induce b v 1n > b v 0n and e v 1n > e v 0n . The idiosyncratic factor captures how an individual is socialized. I concentrate on vertical socialization by benevolent parents, thus abstracting from horizontal and oblique socialization. If parents do not exert e¤ort, individuals are assumed to endorse the reference value system of their nationality. By exerting e¤orts, parents can shift their child's values away from the reference value system. This captures the malleability of character during childhood and early adolescence that has been identi…ed by research on human development.
Parents' in ‡uence depends on the resources that they invest in socialization. Let a (i) and n (i) respectively denote a parent's investment in achievementorientation and in nationalism; the resulting value system for a domestic citizen is given by:
Analogous expressions hold for immigrants after substituting b v an with the corresponding 7 See e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2009) for an excellent survey.
e v an . 8 Without signi…cant loss of generality, I assume that parameters are such that parents choose internal values, i.e. v an (i) 2 (0; 1) for all a, n and i. Instilling values is assumed to be costly for parents. First, there is a cost caused by the overall amount of socialization e¤ort exerted by parents; this cost increases with j a (i)j + j n (i)j. Second, parents incur a speci…c cost for manipulating the value attached to each trait, achievement and nationality. Those costs depend on a parent's skill in transmitting values. Parents whose own value system attaches a large value to achievement must spend less e¤ort in order to obtain a given increase in her children's valuation of achievement as compared to parents who attach little value to achievement. Similarly, nationalistic parents have a comparative advantage in transmitting an attachment to own nation. For simplicity, I assume that total costs incurred by an individual's parent to socialize her child are given by
Parameters and may be thougth of as capturing both the values of the parents and the intrinsic strength of the national value system: the weaker parents'valuation of a given trait and the more convincing the reference value system of their group, the larger are the costs to inculcate di¤erent values, and the small are and .
Utility function.
Individuals care about consumption and esteem, in addition to the e¤ort costs incurred when socializing their children and acquiring human capital. Preferences are additively separable and represented by the utility function
The …rst term on the r.h.s. captures utility from consumption, which is given by the individual's wage. The second one captures utility from self-esteem. An individual's selfesteem is the esteem in which he holds his type: if an individual i is the type an, his self-esteem is given by v an (i). The third term of the utility function captures utility from social interactions. Independently of their nationality, adult individuals are randomly matched into pairs. 9 At each encounter they exchange courtesy or hostility according to their traits and values. Courtesy and hostility are relational goods that are not exchanged 8 Notice that an immigrant's parent who wants to increase the value attached by her child to own nationality chooses n < 0.
9 An alternative assumption is social segregation, where individuals have a higher probability to meet somebody of the same nationality. This may be a better assumption if one is to analyze racial relations in US ghettos. That assumption generates the possibility of diverging conformist e¤ects in values and behavior across races. 7 through markets but through social interactions. I refer to them as the social esteem enjoined by individuals. The esteem that an individual receives from a social contact depends on the value attached by his social contact on the individual's type. I assume that nationality is perfectly observed by social contacts, while achievement is observed with probability 1 . The expected social esteem received by a native with achievement level a is therefore given by
where b a is the fraction of achievers in the native population. A symmetric de…nition of socv(i) applies for migrants. The preference parameters and are strictly positive and capture the strength of value concerns.
Equilibrium.
An equilibrium is a situation in which each agent chooses his e¤ort levels to shape his values and to build human capital so as to maximize his expected utility, taking the choices of all other agents as given. To shorten the exposition, I only consider parameter constellations that give rise to equilibria that are interior with respect to the probability to achieve, i.e. such that + e 2 (0; 1).
Individual optimization
At the family level, both the wage structure and levels of social esteem are taken as exogenouos. A native family maximizes
where
2! is a shorthand for the costs incurred by the agent as a function of his three control variables. The immigrants'decision problem is similar and will not be explicitly presented.
As a …rst step, it is instructive to discuss the determination of the child's achievement level. When the child selects his e¤ort, his value system has already crystallized, inducing reduced-form preferences for e¤ort summarized by the objective function
The …rst-order condition for an interior maximum entails
Thus, an individual's expected achievement + e is driven by four factors: his ability, as proxied by and , his character, as proxied by v 11 v 01 , pecuniary incentives, w H w L , and social incentives, socv 11 socv 01 . As shown by (5), values transmitted to the individual by society and his parents generate an incentive e¤ect: the individual's e¤ort is strictly increasing with v 11 v 01 = b v 11 b v 01 + 2 a . The intuition is simple: the larger the value attached to achievement, the larger is the self-esteem obtained from achieving relative to the self-esteem in case of failure, and the stronger is the incentive for the individual to exert e¤ort.
When parents socialize their children, they anticipate the incentive e¤ect of value transmission. The result of their maximization exercise is described in the following 10 Proposition 1 A unique optimal strategy always exists and has n > 0 in case of natives and n < 0 in case of immigrants. Depending on parameter values, one of the following cases occur at the optimum: 1) a < 0, e = 0; 2) a < 0, e > 0; 3) a = 0, e > 0; 4)
Parents have an incentive to invest in nationalism because it has a positive in ‡uence on the child's self-esteem for sure and a small investment causes negligible costs. Instead, parents do not necessarily invest in the achievement-orientation of their children. The welfare impact of investing in achievement orientation can be decomposed into a mechanical and a behavioral e¤ect. The mechanical e¤ect is the expected change in self-esteem caused by attaching more value to achievement. Its expected return is positive if and only if the probability for the child to be an achiever (given by + e) is larger than the probability to be a loser (given by 1 e). The behavioral e¤ect is the change in the marginal return to e¤ort. Increasing the achievement-orientation of the child generates an incentive to exert more e¤ort because the achievement orientation increases the loss of self-esteem in case of failure. If the probability to achieve is low, the mechanical e¤ect may dominate and the parent may decide to invest to decrease the achievement orientation of her child ( a < 0). If the probability is high, the mechanical e¤ect and the behavioral e¤ect may reinforce each other and the parent may choose to enhance the achievement orientation of her child ( a > 0).
10 Proofs of all propositions appear in the Appendix. In order for the maximization problems to be well-behaved, parameters must satisfy
which I assume to be the case throught the paper. 9
General equilibrium
At the general-equilibrium level, the income levels of achievers and losers and the social esteem of each type are endogenous. The wage determination follows the usual logic of scarcity: the wage di¤erential is given by
which is decreasing in the fraction of achievers in the two groups, b a and e a.
The di¤erence in social esteem between achievers and losers reads
for natives and
for immigrants, where b a and e a are the average investments in achievement orientation in the two groups. Those average investments increase the social esteem of the achievers and decrease the social esteem of the losers, and hence raise the esteem di¤erential.
The following fact can be established:
Proposition 2 A general equilibrium always exists. Multiple equilibria are possible if < 1 and is su¢ ciently large.
Multiple equilibria are interesting as they point out the possibility of a drastic effect from improved schooling. In case of multiple stable equilibria, a low-achievementorientation, low-e¤ort equilibrium coexists with a high-achievement-orientation, highe¤ort equilibrium. Then, a small schooling reform that marginally increases children's abilities ( ; ) may eliminate an equilibrium with low achievement orientation, and therefore low social esteem to achievers, and make the economy jump to an achievementoriented one, where achievers obtain a high level of social esteem. In this case, output grows and the skill wage di¤erential w H w L decreases because of the increase in the fraction of achievers.
The conditions for equilibrium multiplicity can be explained as follows. Parents'socialization e¤orts generate an externality because their children's values determine how others fare in social interactions. Multiplicity arises if those externalities induce other parents to change their socialization e¤orts. An increase of achievement orientation for some children increases the social esteem received by achievers as compared to losers; this strengthens the incentive for other children to exert e¤ort, hence their probability to succeed increases. As a consequence, their parents have an incentive to raise the achievement orientation of their children, i.e. a bandwagon e¤ect of increasing achievement orientation sets in. In order for this cumulative causation to occur, an increase of achievement orientation must e¤ectively increase the esteem received by achievers relative to that received by losers, socv 1n socv 0n . This is only possible if achievement is observable ( < 1). If achievement is private information, all natives get the same social esteem, independently of their achievement, all immigrants get the same social esteem, independently of their achievement, and social esteem has no behavioral e¤ect.
In order for that cumulative causation to generate multiple equilibria, utility must respond strongly enough to changes in social esteem. If a low-achievement-orientation, low-e¤ort economy is an equilibrium, a high-achievement-orientation, high-e¤ort economy can also be an equilibrium only if the gain of social esteem of achievers in the latter case compensates in utility terms the associated higher e¤ort cost and lower income gain. This requires to be su¢ ciently large. 
Predictions for nationalism
While natives and immigrants have similar incentives to shape values about achievement, they have diametrically opposed incentives with respect to nationalism. Indeed, two individuals that only di¤er with respect to their nationality optimally choose opposite levels of n ; those magnitudes determine the di¢ dence that they experience when they interact. Hence, investments in nationalism may be seen as proxies for interethnic con ‡ict or inversely related to the quality of social interactions between natives and immigrants.
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In the current model, nationalism can be predicted by ability. The following result is stated for natives and an equivalent one holds true for immigrants.
Proposition 3 Increasing gradually moves the optimal strategy from con…guration 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 as of Proposition 1. The correlation between natives'nationalism and ability is @ n @ > 0 in con…gurations 1 and 2, @ n @ = 0 in con…guration 3, and
In con…gurations 1 and 2 the ability parameter is very low and parents invest to decrease the value attached to achievement ( a < 0) in order to raise the child's future self-esteem. In those parameter regions, when grows, parents become less sure that the child will be a loser. Then, an increase of leads them to make a less negative, i.e. they come closer to their group's reference values: parents' socialization e¤orts as expressed by j a j decrease. As a consequence, the marginal costs of investing in nationalism become lower. This leads parents to increase n .
A further increase of moves the optimal strategy into con…guration 3. This region is characterized by a corner solution with respect to achievement orientation, i.e. a = 0: the agent endorses the valuation of achievement given by the reference value system of his nationality. This is the parameter region where nationalism reaches its peak since parents can devote their entire socialization e¤orts to it: no e¤ort is devoted to a¤ect the achievement orientation of children. This occurs because the ability of the child is perceived to be insu¢ cient to make achievement a likely outcome.
If crosses some threshold, parents invest in achievement values ( a > 0) and con…guration 4 occurs. In this region, the complementarity between socialization and child's e¤ort sets in. An increase in leads parents to invest more value in achievement, which increases e¤ort, which increases the probability to succeed, which makes investing in achievement even more appealing. The ensuing increase in the marginal costs of socialization leads parents to decrease their investment in nationalism. An increase in child's ability makes therefore parents subtitute nationalism with achievement orientation.
The comparative statics of can be explained along similar lines. In con…guration 1, e = 0 so that does not matter. In con…gurations 2, 3 and 4 the e¤ect from is qualitatively identical to the one from .
In the most general case, ability entertains a hump-shaped relationship with nationalistic attitudes. At very low levels of ability -such that e = 0 and/or a 0 -nationalism is increasing with ability. At intermediate levels, nationalism peaks and small changes in ability have no e¤ect on it. At higher levels of ability, nationalism continuously declines with ability.
To the extent that and do not only mirror genetic traits but also capture the qual- The answer to that question is arguably a reliable indicator of an individual's self-esteem derived from own nationality.
German youth
The German DJI Youth Survey is a repeated cross-sectional survey which was carried out The estimated e¤ect of ability on nationalism is displayed in Table 1 . The …rst two columns report results from a binary logit estimation; nationalism is coded as 1 if the respondent is very proud of being German and 0 otherwise. The remaining columns report estimations from an ordered logit model. The results show that educational attainment has a strongly signi…cant impact on the degree of nationalism of the German youth. Individuals with low education are more nationalistic than individuals with intermediate education while individuals with high education are less nationalistic than individuals with intermediate education. The implied negative causal e¤ect of ability on nationalism is consistent with the comparative statics of the model where optimal strategies are based on parameter constellations that lead to con…guration 4, i.e. ability levels are relatively high.
Is nationalism associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants? Table 2 shows that in the DJI Youth Survey this is clearly the case. Nationalism is strongly correlated with a number of proxies of xenophobia derived from various survey questions. All reported correlation coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant at the 1 % level. 
ISSP
The "National Identity 2003" module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) covers most OECD countries; it samples about 45,000 adult individuals. An advantage of this data source as compared to the DJI Survey is that educational attainment is more …nely coded according to the following six categories: "No education"; "Primary education", "Some secundary education", Secundary education", "Above secundary education", "Tertiary education". Regression results are exhibited in Table 3 . Again, the …rst two columns report results from a binary logit estimation and the two other columns report estimations from an ordered logit model. All regressions include unreported country dummies; standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country of the respondent. Note: All regressions include country dummies. The omitted education category is "Some secundary education". For higher educa-tional attainments, the results show again a negative relationship between education and nationalism. That negative relationship extends to those with only "Primary education", who are found to be more nationalistic than those with "Some secundary education".
However, at even lower attainments ("No education") there is no statistically signi…cant e¤ect of education on nationalism, i.e. the nationalism of individuals with no education seems to be closer to that of individuals with some secundary education than to that of individuals with only primary education. 
WVS
The third data souce is the World Value Survey in its waves 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004 and 2005 . The distinctive advantage of this source is that it includes many developing countries where educational attainment is relatively low; the sample has more than 250,000
observations. 13 In this data source there is a survey question directly related to the relative value assigned to the respondent's country. Individuals were asked whether they agree with the following statement: "Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries". Answers are signi…cantly correlated with the nationalism proxy used in the regressions, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.33.
(1) (2) ( 1' Note: All regressions include country and wave dummies. Table 4 con…rms the results from the above analyses. The declining part of the humpshaped relationship between ability and nationalism put forward by the theoretical model is clearly detectable in the data, while there is some weak evidence in support of the increasing part of that relationship.
The last wave of the WVS includes information about the nationality of the respondents' parents. According to the theoretical approach proposed in this paper, foreign parents of naturalized individuals are predicted to induce less nationalism because they are unlikely to endorse it in …rst place -their is lower, i.e. it is more costly for them to instill nationalism. Furthermore, socialization may have taken place behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. before migration; this may also imply a lower degree of nationalism for children of foreign parents. Table 5 presents regression results when parent's immigrant status is controlled for. Consistently with expectations, immigrated parents seem to lower their children's degree of nationalism. Moreover, individuals with no education are found to be signi…cantly less nationalistic than individuals with some secundary education. This lends some empirical support to the increasing part of the relationship between ability and nationalism put forward by the theoretical model. Di¤erently from the US, there is no "European dream" on which European countries can rely to foster the assimilation of immigrants into their societies. This does not mean that immigrants in Europe are condemned to live apart from the rest of society -like the black population that lives in US ghettos. Between assimilation and ghettization there exists a whole spectrum of social interactions between natives and immigrants characterized by some integration of the two groups. Integration is a two-sided process. A prerequisite of it is some mutual respect of the identity of the other group. Without mutual esteem, spatial and social segregation are likely to persist. This paper has argued that the improvement of human abilities through better schools has a positive impact on mutual respect and contributes to reduce interethnic con ‡ict. The argument does not rely upon a Victorian view of schools as intruments to improve character, but on the self-interest of agents who socialize their children. The novel idea put forward by the model is that investing resources to increase the cognitive ability of low-ability natives may improve the integration of immigrants in society. Such an investment is predicted to induce parents of low-ability children to raise their children's perseverance and conscientiousness and to avoid boosting their self-esteem by transmitting a feeling of national or racial superiority.
In turn, this social change of values will strenghten the incentive for immigrants to invest in their and their children's human capital.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Since parents'and children's interests are perfecty aligned and their information sets are identical, an agent's optimal strategy simply is to maximize (4) with respect to the three control variables e, n and a . To begin with, notice that the optimal strategy entails n 0 for a domestic citizen ( n 0 for an immigrant). Suppose by way of contradiction that the optimal socialization of a domestic citizen entails n < 0. Starting from such a situation, a marginal increase in nationalism a¤ects expected utility as follows
@E[U ]
@ n = n + j a j n > 0;
which contradicts the assertion that n < 0. The four mutually exclusive possible solutions are as follows.
Con…guration 1: n > 0, a < 0, e = 0.
The FOCs are in this case:
@ n = n n a = 0;
while the corner solution e = 0 requires 
Con…guration 2: n > 0, a < 0, e > 0.
The associated FOCs are 
Con…guration 3: n > 0, a = 0, e > 0.
The FOCs are (7) 
The optimal strategy has (5) and 
Simple algebraic manipulations show that the eight remaining possible con…gurations can never be optimal. QED Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium existence follows from standard theorems of existence of Nash equilibrium for nonatomic games, see e.g. Rath (1992) . Equilibrium multiplicity can be ruled out for = 0, while standard social-multiplier arguments show that for su¢ ciently large multiple equilibria arise. QED This con…guration only exists if 1 > 0, which is assumed to be the case. By di¤erentiating (8) one obtains @ n =@ > 0.
Proof of Proposition
Con…guration 2: It is easy to check that the parameter restriction that implies e > 0 also guarantees n > 0. That restriction is
In order for con…guration 2 to exist, parameters must also guarantee a < 0. This condition can be written as
As it is easily checked, 2 ( 2 ) > 1 if 2 2 (0; ) and 2 ( ) = 1 , which shows that con…guration 2 occurs if 1 < < 2 ( 2 ). By di¤erentiating (10) one obtains @ n =@ > 0.
Con…guration 3: Parameter restrictions are only required to ensure that a = 0.
Condition (12) As it is easily checked, 3 ( 2 ) > 2 ( 2 ), which shows that con…guration 3 occurs if 2 ( 2 )
3 ( 2 ). By di¤erentiating (13) one obtains @ n =@ = 0.
Con…guration 4: The parameter restriction for a > 0 automatically implies e > 0.
Condition a > 0 is equivalent to
The equilibrium condition n > 0 requires
As it is easily checked, 4 ( 2 ) > 3 ( 2 ) if 2 2 (0; ) and 4 ( ) = 3 ( ), which shows that con…guration 4 occurs if 3 ( ) < < 4 ( 2 ). By di¤erentiating (16) one obtains @ n =@ < 0.
QED

